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• This paper describes sovereign credit ratings in emerging markets
both for a specific year and over time, using quantitative explanatory
variables.
• It turns out that rating adjustments have been worse than what
economic fundamentals justify for some countries and also more
frequently altered, questioning the long-term properties of sovereign
ratings.
• The results support the view that rating changes during the Asian
crisis have been pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical. Omitted
variables, such as soundness of banking sector, social and political
factors, can be one reason for this misalignment but cannot explain
all.







This paper describes sovereign credit ratings in emerging markets both for a
specific year and over time, using quantitative explanatory variables. It turns
out that rating adjustments have been worse than what economic
fundamentals justify for some countries and also more frequently altered,
questioning the long-term properties of sovereign ratings. The results
support the view that rating changes during the Asian crisis have been pro-
cyclical rather than counter-cyclical. Omitted variables, such as soundness of
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1. Introduction
Sovereign credit ratings are not “country ratings” but address the credit risk of national governments,
not the specific default risk of other issuers, see Beers and Cavanaugh (1998). The Standard & Poor’s
rating categories are an assessment of the “economy’s growth prospects, the government’s fiscal
flexibility, the government's debt burden, monetary stance, balance of payments flexibility, external
debt burden” as well as the government's political risk, see Chambers (1999). Hence, sovereign
country ratings are based on a number of macroeconomic fundamental factors as well as some
qualitative variables. If this is the case it should be possible to understand the rationale for a specific
rating and when it is due for a change by monitoring these factors.
The influence of sovereign credit ratings does, however, stretch beyond government securities as
sovereign ratings usually serve as a ceiling for private sector ratings. During the past few years
sovereign credit ratings have become increasingly influential, receiving extensive news coverage and
affecting both investments and interest-rate spreads, see e.g. Ramcharran (1999). Meanwhile the
rating agencies have come under severe criticism for the timing of their downgrades, that is, when a
country receives a lower score than it used to have, see for example Larrain et al. (1997). The
disadvantage of late downgrades is, except for giving late notice to the clients of the rating institute,
that they will exacerbate the already negative sentiment for an economy in trouble. An early
downgrade on the other hand, taking place before the full-fledged crisis, could dampen the capital
inflows and smooth the downturn, see e.g. Reisen and von Maltzan (1999). There are however great
risks with early downgrades. Sovereign credit ratings are long-term ratings and the rating agencies are
afraid of acting on short-term fluctuations. Due to the strong market impact of rating changes there is
a risk that an early downgrade could push a country over the edge into a crisis, while under normal
circumstances, i.e. no downgrade, the economy would be able to get back on track. So the accurate
timing of a downgrade is important.
The objective of this paper is twofold: The first is to find out to what extent macroeconomic
fundamentals can explain the actual rating category for one point in time. The second is to describe
the development of the rating categories over time. Hence, two separate models will be constructed:
one static and one dynamic. Sovereign credit ratings also consist of a qualitative assessment for each
country, which is formed at the time of the rating release. This information is not available and it is not
possible to create such a series afterwards, since knowing the answer to all historical uncertainties
would only render a biased series. Instead, the econometric methods applied have to take account of
the fact that not all variables are included in the estimation. The study will only consider emerging
markets.
The result of the first model (static) shows that a small number of macroeconomic variables can
explain a major part of the rating categories. The random effects are also important for the good fit as3
they capture the country-specific heterogeneity, which is a result of the omitted qualitative variables.
It turns out that the influence of certain variables has increased during the sample: interest rate
spreads and short-term debt to reserves. These variables are not significant when estimated and
evaluated for the full sample but significant when evaluated for a short sample 1998-1999, i.e. after
the East Asian crises. Rating adjustments have also been more frequent than what the model
suggests, questioning the capability of sovereign credit ratings to be as long-term, forward-looking
assessments as they claim to be, see Chambers (1999).
The second model (dynamic) is specified to describe rating changes over time. It performs even
better than the static model with higher explanatory power and also better-behaved residuals. The
most influential variable is the lagged rating category but the majority of the other variables,
transformed into annual changes, are also highly significant. As for the static model the short-term
debt to reserves variable is only significant for the very short sample 1998-1999. The result shows
that the choice of variables considered when evaluating a country can differ over time as we update
our knowledge of what can drive a financial crisis.
The actual rating categories are also compared to a continuous crisis definition, in order to find out
whether the rating changes are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. That is, whether ratings are worsened
when the economy is turning down (pro-cyclical) or if the countries are downgraded ahead of the
downturn. This analysis is performed for the 1997 East Asian crisis. Ideally a rating change should
occur before a crisis, since that would signal that the situation in the economy is not as good as it
used to be, depressing investor sentiment. If the crisis is less severe, not influencing fundamentals,
the rating should remain the same unless the long-term outlook has changed. The results in this paper
show that rating changes are pro-cyclical; increasing in good times and decreasing in the midst of the
crisis. The result can be influenced by the fact that we are using annual observations, but that does
not explain all.
The outline of the paper is as follows: in the next section, Section 2, a few results from previous
studies will be reviewed. It continues by presenting the choice of indicators that will be included in
the specifications. Section 3 is devoted to a discussion on methodological issues starting by
discussing the transformation of the rating categories into numerical values and also the choice of
estimation methods. The data together with the results of the estimated models can be found in
Section 4. Section 5 contains our conclusions.
2. Background
In this section a few studies on sovereign credit ratings will be reviewed and followed by a
presentation of the explanatory variables that will be included in this study.
2.1 Previous studies
In a seminal paper Cantor and Packer (1996) make a quantitative assessment of sovereign credit
ratings assigned by Moody’s Investor Service and Standard & Poor’s for a single year: 1995. They find4
that a small number of quantitative variables, to a large extent (R
2=92%), are able explain the rating
categories. The study is performed for a group of industrial countries and emerging markets. The
included criteria are: per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance,
external debt, economic development and default history, all measured as four-year averages. Despite
the success in describing ratings in 1995, later studies have found that their results are not robust
over time and especially not for the rating changes during the East Asian crisis in 1997/98. This makes
sense since the origin of that crisis was different compared to previous ones. It also gave rise to new
criteria such as short-term debt, etc.
Ferri et al. (1999) claim that the rating agencies aggravated the East Asian crisis by downgrading them
more than the deterioration in the economic fundamentals would justify. The economic fundamentals
included in their specification are the same as in the Cantor and Packer (1996) study together with
short-term debt to reserves since that has been put forward as an influential factor in the East Asian
crisis and has since been included in the rating agencies’ evaluation (Chambers, 2001). Ferri et al.
(1999) conclude that the downgrades increased the cost of borrowing capital abroad and shrank the
supply of international credit. They also find that rating adjustments are pro-cyclical rather than
counter-cyclical.
Mora (2001), on the other hand, suggests that the spreads already increased before the rating change
and, hence, that sovereign ratings lag the interest rate spreads, instead of the other way around. She
observes that the cost of capital already was high when the downgrades finally occurred but agrees
with Ferri et al. (1999) that they are pro-cyclical. The bi-causal relationship between interest rate
spreads and sovereign ratings is supported by Larrain et al. (1997) and Reisen and von Maltzan (1999)
who test Granger causality and find a bi-directional causality. They believe that rating changes
intensify the boom-bust cycles and support the doubts that rating announcements lead the market.
Monfort and Mulder (2000) explain Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s ratings changes for both a specific
year and over time. They include several explanatory variables: in levels as well as in first differences.
They also allow for several lags using a panel data model with a common intercept. The advantage in
this study is that they allow for a dynamic specification but the disadvantage is of course difficulties
with degrees of freedom when allowing for long lags and many explanatory variables as time series
are short. Also, by using a common intercept they do not account for omitted qualitative factors in
their econometric specification, which also could be a disadvantage. The paper concludes that rating
agencies act pro-cyclically to crisis indicators and that parameters are not stable over time.
There appears to be a consensus that rating agencies are lagging rather than leading economic crises.
But these results are based on static models that do not include the latest available rating observation
as one of the explanatory variables, which might not be optimal. The dynamic model, see Monfort and
Mulder (2000), does not allow for country heterogeneity in that they use a common intercept for all5
countries. In this paper I will distinguish between the dynamic and the static specification. Both will,
however, allow for country-specific omitted variables.
2.2 Explanatory variables
This study includes the same quantitative indicators as the ones chosen by Cantor and Packer (1996).
They proved to be successful in previous studies explaining rating categories (see Section 2.1). The
indicators are: per capita income: Mirroring the potential tax base in a country and the ability of the
government to repay its debt. GDP growth: Where a higher growth rate would make the debt easier
to service. Inflation: Portraying structural problems in government finance, printing money instead of
raising taxes to cover its expenses. Fiscal balance: Government lacks ability or willingness to tax its
citizens, also absorbs private savings. External balance: A deficit forces the government to rely on
funds from abroad. External debt to exports/GDP: If the debt grows faster than exports (or GDP) the
risk of default increases.
After the East Asian crisis other explanatory variables were put forward: Short-term currency debt to
foreign reserves: To measure the liquidity conditions in a country, see Ferri et al. (1999). Export
growth: Where higher export earnings makes the debt default less likely. Interest rate spreads:
Where increasing spreads mirror the investors’ increased risk premium, suggesting debt default being
more likely, Mora (2001). The latter suggesting that spreads cause ratings instead of the other way
around.
3. Methodology
This section starts by describing how the rating categories are transformed into numerical values and
continues by reviewing the econometric methods available for the study. Note that qualitative
variables, such as political uncertainty or political issues will not be considered, as discussed in the
introduction. This does not imply that they are superfluous in describing the actual ratings but rather
that no objective series exist describing such issues, which is why qualitative variables are excluded
altogether in this paper.
3.1 Transforming rating categories
The rating categories themselves do not correspond to a particular number and have to be
transformed into some numerical value before the econometric analysis can begin. As long as the
ordinal nature of data is reflected in the numerical values a BB+, for example, could be any number.
Quantifying the rating categories there is a choice between doing a linear transformation, which is
most common, see e.g. Cantor and Packer (1996), or a nonlinear one, see e.g. Reisen and von
Maltzan (1999). While a linear transformation assumes the distance between the rating categories to
be identical, a nonlinear transformation makes them different depending on whether the rating moves
from a BB+ to a BB. If a logistic function is applied, the transformation function will be “S-shaped”,
suggesting that the rating steps in the middle of the span are “larger” than the ones in the tails.
Considering that a rating change from investment to speculative grade can increase the difficulties for6
a country on the international debt markets it is possible that the distance between the steps are
uneven. On the other hand, except for that example, it seems highly unlikely that there is a difference
between the categories. Ferri et al. (1999) make both a linear and a nonlinear transformation but the
conclusions from the models are similar. Moreover, no such difference is said to exist according to
Standard & Poor’s, see Beers and Cavanaugh (1998), and a linear transformation will be used. The
transformation table can be found in Appendix A.
3.2 Methodological issues
The complex nature of ratings observations: discrete, bounded and ordinal also put certain restrictions
on the econometric methods applicable. An ordered regression model would appear to be the optimal
choice since it is especially designed to deal with bounded, discrete, ordinal data, see e.g. Greene
(1993). But this method cannot account for the unobserved country heterogeneity due to the absent
qualitative assessment, which is why a different methodology has to be applied. A probit and/or logit
model is often applied, see e.g Ferri et al. (1999), Mora (2001). This is probably because of the
bounded dependent variable. However, the transformation to numerical values left us with sixteen
categories, which is quite a lot for a discrete variable; therefore no special treatment should be
required for the data’s discrete or bounded features, increasing the number of models available. A
panel data model is of course the preferred choice because of the few observations and the many
countries. By assuming that the omitted variables are country dependent and time independent a
fixed-effect panel data model would be appropriate for the estimations. But the fixed-effect model is
“expensive” in terms of degrees of freedom which is why it is vital to test whether it significantly
improves the explanatory power of the model compared to the common intercept approach. An F-test
is calculated to compare the explanatory power of the two models where the null hypothesis is that
the two models are equal. For details on this test, see Hsiao (1986). A random effect model could also
be considered if the effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. This is unlikely when
considering country ratings and omitted qualitative variables, since that would require that they are
uncorrelated with the quantitative variables, hence no correlation between i.e. quality of financial
system and bank lending. A Hausman test will be performed to choose between specifications. The
test is designed to test for orthogonality between the random effects and the regressors, see Greene
(1993) using a Chi-square distribution. When there is a significant difference between the two models
the regressors are correlated with the random effects and, in that case, a fixed-effect model is
estimated.
To achieve the first goal of the paper, describing the actual ratings at a certain point in time, a cross-
section study would be sufficient. But given that we not are interested in a particular year a static
panel data model is preferred since that will increase the number of observations. In order to attain
the second goal of the paper, describing rating changes over time, a dynamic panel data model is
estimated. But when a panel data model includes lagged dependent explanatory variables, standard
estimation procedures leads to estimators which are often seriously biased in small samples. Kiviet
(1995) explores the performance of a series of estimation methods for dynamic panel data models7
with a Monte Carlo study. According to this study a model with a high coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable and only six observations in the time dimension the OLS estimator is the most
efficient. The coefficients of the OLS estimator are biased upwards (positively) but not significantly
according to Kiviet (1995). Moreover, for this sample size and the high magnitude of the estimated
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable the OLS estimator outperforms the GMM, the Anderson-
Hsiao, the instrumental variable and the least square dummy variable according to the root mean
squared errors for the estimated coefficients, which is why the former is selected.
4. Results
The study is performed for 38 emerging markets covering data from 1990 to 1999. The countries
included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Israel, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The
choice of which countries to include is based on data availability and not on any other criteria.
Standard & Poor’s ratings are used for the left-hand side while World Development Indicators from
the World Bank are applied for the explanatory variables, see Appendix B. As data are annual the
number of observations is small and fluctuations within the year will be missed. Also, when a rating
change occurs during a year the rating observation in the study equals the annual average.
Three separate models will be estimated for both the static and the dynamic specification. The first
model, “model 1”, uses the same explanatory variables as Cantor and Packer (1996) did except for
the dummy variables. The second model, “model 2”, adds some variables that have been suggested
in later studies, and the third model, “model 3”, will include all variables that proved to be influential
in the previous two models, being the preferred choice. This model will be the one interpreted when
presenting the results and implications of the models.
4.1 The static model: constituents of sovereign credit ratings
In this specification the aim is to describe the actual rating in a particular year, rather than rating
changes over time. One of the major difficulties in doing this is to decide on how many years of the
explanatory variables that should be considered in the present rating. That is, are the ratings based on
an average of several years of observations or is it only the latest observation that matters? According
to the rating agencies the ratings are forward-looking, long-term evaluations that see through cyclical
behaviour in economic, political, credit and commodity factors, which is why four-year (or longer)
averages should be preferable. There is no obvious answer to that question and both scenarios have
been applied: Cantor and Packer (1996) using four-year averages while Ferri et al. (1999) and Mora
(2001) consider solitary years. In order to find out which scenario is preferable both specifications
have been estimated for this study
1. The explanatory power is slightly higher for the model using four-
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year averages but there are no conspicuous differences between the two considering variables
included or their signs, so single-year observations are chosen because of a scarcity of data.
The first model consists of the explanatory variables of the Cantor and Packer (1996) model except for
the dummy variables “Indicator for economic development” and “Indicator for default history”, which
are excluded. As mentioned above and in the introduction many qualitative aspects that affect the
ratings are disregarded and instead of including dummies for a few of these features a panel data
model with fixed or random effects will be applied. Hence, dummy variables are avoided altogether.
As the aim is to describe sovereign ratings in general rather than focusing on a particular year, the full
sample is used for the estimations. A random effect model is specified, the modelling procedure is
described in Section 3, and the results are presented in the first column of Table 1 (p. 17): “S-model
1”. The adjusted R
2 is high and equals 86% with a standard error barely exceeding one notch. This
result is largely due to the random effects that mirror country-specific information not captured by the
explanatory variables, and could be factors we had to disregard because of data difficulties. The
current account enters significantly but with an unexpected negative sign. This is a common result,
see e.g. Mora (2001), and the reasoning is usually that some countries can “afford” a negative current
account being generally well managed and in an overall good shape. However, looking at the data,
there is a strong and clear negative correlation between rating downgrades and an improved current
account for a majority of the Asian countries from 1996 - 97 and onwards. The econometric model
captures this and interprets it as if a negative current account itself would improve the rating. In the
Cantor and Packer (1996) study CA/GDP did not enter significantly. Except for that the indicators enter
with the expected signs and all are significant on a 10% significance level.
In the second model more explanatory variables are allowed in order to find out if they can improve
the understanding of sovereign credit ratings. The variables are: debt to exports, export growth, short-
term debt to reserves and LIBOR interest rate spreads. All have been suggested in previous studies,
see e.g. Ferri et al. (1999)
2 and Standard & Poor's, Chambers (1999). Due to a high correlation
between the debt variable and the debt to export variable, the debt variable was excluded in this set-
up. The results of this model can be found in the second column in Table 1 (p. 17): “S-model 2”. None
of the new variables enter significantly except for the debt to export variable. Moreover the
explanatory power of the model is not improved. This is puzzling given that short-term debt to
reserves was an important indicator for the East Asian crisis and other studies have shown its
importance using different sample. Cutting out the sample, allowing for only 1998 - 1999: “S-model
2a” in Table 1, short-term debt to reserves does enter with the right sign and is significant. The
spread is also close to entering significantly. However, when euro spreads are used, for a much
smaller sample, they do enter significantly
3. The major problem when including spreads is the short
series available since they have to be transformed into annual numbers. The explanatory power of the
model should not be taken too seriously: it is only due to the short sample.
                                           
2 Euro spreads were initially included but they only cover a few countries and are only available for a short time span, which is
why LIBOR spreads are applied. Slight improvement.9
The conclusion is that both spreads and short-term debt to reserves are important factors in sovereign
country ratings and are therefore included in the final model specification. The result of this model can
be found in the last column: “S-model 3”, in Table 1. The current account still enters with a negative
sign but is not significant. All other variables enter with the expected sign but not all of them enter
significantly.
As can be seen from the model evaluation below each model in Table 1, the Durbin Watson statistic
of first order serial correlation indicates a misspecified model. This can be due to omitted variables or
nonlinearity, for example. The result makes sense in that it seems highly unlikely that the country
analysts at Standard & Poor’s update sovereign credit ratings without looking at last period's rating
category, especially given the long-term aspects of ratings. Hence, a dynamic model where the latest
available rating observation is included is more plausible and this will be explored in the next section,
4.2. But given that most studies which aim at exploring sovereign credit ratings use a static approach,
it is included here for comparability.
The residuals are plotted in Figure 1 (p. 19) sorted by country (alphabetically) and over time. The
residuals are generally in the neighbourhood of within 1 notch. However, there are some extreme
events where the model over- or underestimates the rating categories. In the former part of Figure 1
the conspicuous positive biases are due to Indonesia 1994 - 1997, where the model constantly under-
predicts the actual ratings, indicating that the country is overrated with respect to fundamentals. The
large negative residuals that follow immediately after that also refers to Indonesia, but for 1998 –
2000. The errors amount to at least four notches, and it appears as even though the model suggested
a downgrade it cannot capture the magnitude of it. In the middle of Figure 1 there is another
conspicuous negative peak that is due to the Korea downgrade in 1998 and a little later there is
another one, which refers to the Philippines, 1998. Also for these countries the model suggests a
downgrade but does not capture the magnitude of it.
The fitted values of “S-model 3”, the preferred model specification, are plotted against the actual
rating numbers in Figure 3 (p. 19). If the model could predict the rating categories perfectly, the
observations would be a thin diagonal line. The “thicker” the line, the worse the mistakes. Generally
they are in the neighbourhood of this line but it is not perfect. The largest discrepancies refers to
Korea 1998, point (15,19) and Indonesia 1998, point (10,15).
Some of the “badly behaving” countries from each of Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe are
discussed at some length in the following. Generally the estimated static model detects the overrated
Asian countries in the middle of the 1990s with one or two notches, with the results for Korea
displayed in Figure 3 (p. 19). The country was upgraded in 1994 but this was not because of an
improvement in the macroeconomic fundamentals, which is why the rating of the model does not
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change. Both the actual rating as well as the model estimates decreased during 1997, the model
smoothly and the rating institute sharply. In 1998 there is a discrepancy of four notches between the
two. In 1999 the model rating deteriorates further while Standard & Poor’s (S&P) update the country,
making the difference smaller, one notch, the model still having the positive view. After that both the
S&P and model estimates improved the view on Korea. Hence, it appears as if S&P overreacted in its
rating adjustments. Also, the adjustments are too frequent to be interpreted as a long-term country
assessment, which is said to be the objective according to S&P, see e.g. Chambers (2001). The
development in Thailand is quite different, see Figure 4 (p. 19) where the model results in a higher
rating than S&P at the beginning of the sample. However, the model’s good opinion of Thailand
deteriorates from 1991 onwards. The two are equal in 1994 where S&P upgrades Thailand further
while the model suggests a further decline. In 1996 the divergence amounts to two notches, S&P
taking the positive view, and in 1998 it is one notch, the model being the positive part. Again in Figure
5 (p. 20) the rating history for Indonesia is displayed. The S&P has a more optimistic view on the
country until 1997/98 when it turns more negative compared to the model estimates. In 2000 the
model supports a higher rating than S&P but this might be the result of omitted qualitative factors
given that the political situation within the country is quite turbulent. Hence, it appears as if the
estimated model is less volatile than the actual rating, which usually is the case for modelled series
compared to real. However, the discrepancies are large and quite frequent, questioning the validity of
S&P ratings being the long-term, forward-looking estimates they claim to be.
In Argentina the model initially over-predicts the rating, which might be due to the late effect of the
Mexican crisis 1994, Figure 6 (p. 20). But for 1999 and 2000 the model is suggesting that the country
is overrated since the discrepancy between the two exceeds one notch. In Russia, Figure 7 (p. 20),
the rating decreased five notches between 1997 and 1999, when it reached its minimum. The
fundamentals suggested that the country was overrated in 1997, and underrated in 1999 compared to
the model estimates. However, for 2000 both are in the same neighbourhood. The results of the
Czech Republic can be found in Figure 8. The actual rating and the model estimate are generally quite
close. The exception is in 1995 where the model suggests that it is undervalued at 1.5 notches. In
1996 the model estimates were stable while the country got an upgrade, suggesting that the model
has some predictive power.
Generally it appears as if the Cantor and Packer (1996) indicators still hold in that they are able to
explain a major part of the sovereign credit ratings. It also turns out that the model improves further
when the “new” variables, whose importance was obvious during the East Asian crisis (1997), are
included. Also, the random effects are vital for the good performance of the model allowing for
country heterogeneity. Furthermore, the model appears to be more forward-looking than S&P for this
short sample.11
4.2 The dynamic model: development of sovereign credit ratings
When discussing changes or developments in sovereign credit ratings the latest available rating for a
specific country is usually an important factor. Disregarding the time-series structure of the data might
not be optimal when choosing the econometric method, in particular since there is a lot of information
captured in the last period rating. Moreover, ratings are long-term assessments and do not change
between the years on a regular basis. Unfortunately the sovereign credit ratings for emerging markets
are a rather new phenomenon and, as mentioned in Section 3, the time series are generally short.
However, cross-sections are large and the total number of observations adequate.
In this set-up it is assumed that all information is efficiently used in the last year country rating
assessment, which is why lags of the dependent variables should be superfluous in the model
4.
Rating changes should therefore only occur when there has been a change in the explanatory
variables. Hence, all indicators enter contemporaneously in first differences (annual changes). The
modelling procedure is the same as for the static model, see Section 4.1, where the first model
includes the indicators suggested by Cantor and Packer (1996), except for the dummies. A random
effect model is estimated and the results can be found in Table 2 (p. 18), first column: “D-model 1”.
As expected the most important variable in this specification is last year’s rating category, which
enters with a high coefficient (0.92) and significantly. The inclusion of the lagged rating variables also
makes the random effects less influential, since a majority of the country specific features are
captured in the old rating. Annual changes in current account to GDP enter with a negative sign and is
significant on 10%, a discussion on the negative sign of this coefficient can be found in Section 4.1.
Annual changes in external debt, fiscal balance and annual growth in GDP do not enter significantly
while rate of change of inflation and annual growth in GDP per capita enters significantly and with the
expected signs. The explanatory power is higher and the model is better behaved than the static
model as there is no error autocorrelation.
In the second model, “D-model 2” in Table 2, more explanatory variables are included. These are the
variables that are said to be more influential after the East Asian Crisis. And indeed, none of them
enter significantly unless the sample is cut to only include 1998 - 1999. For this sample the annual
growth in short-term debt to reserves turns significant. The change in spreads does not enter
significantly, which is different from the results of “S-model 2a” in Table 1 as well as the results in
Mora (2001). However, none of these models are dynamic.
In the final and preferred specification, “D-model 3”, the annual change in interest rate spreads and
export growth are excluded together with growth in the external debt, since they have not entered
significantly in any of the previous specifications.
                                           
4 This is unfortunately not the case. A few of the dependent variables enter significantly when last year rating is included in the
specification. Results are not shown here. However, previous changes in these variables have not been powerful enough to
create a rating change earlier which should affect how well reflected they are in the ratings.12
The residuals are displayed in Figure 9 (p. 21) and the three of the major peaks that is conspicuous in
the static model are distinct here as well, they are Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines 1998. This
implies that the model does not get the magnitude of the rating changes, just like the static model.
The plot of rating forecasts by the dynamic model compared to the actual ratings look better than for
the static model, see Figure 10 (p. 21), as it is slimmer. The observations are closer together
compared to the observation in Figure 2, and the spread is not as big as it was for the others
specification.
For a closer look at the ratings and the dynamic model estimates for a few countries see Figures 11 –
12 (p. 21): Argentina and Venezuela in Latin America; Figures 13 – 14 (p. 22) show Czech Republic and
Hungary in Eastern Europe and Figures 15 – 16 (p. 22) Korea and Thailand in Asia. In Argentina the
model suggests an upgrade in 1996 and an upgrade did occur in 1997. The same thing happened in
1997 when the model once again suggested an upgrade, which took place in 1998. However, in 1998
the model suggested that a downturn was imminent implying an overrating in 1999. A downgrade
came about in 2000. Hence, for this case the model performs very well and also supports the idea
that rating agencies are slow in changing the ratings as they do not want to act on short-term
fluctuations. In Venezuela, displayed in Figure 12 and chosen because of its long time series, the
rating and the model are usually quite close. The model is more volatile than the rating, which is
expected since ratings are long-term and are meant to see through business cycles. The largest
discrepancy was in 1997, exceeding one notch, the model having the positive outlook. However,
Venezuela got upgraded and the difference is less than half a notch after that.
The model performs well in explaining the rating adjustments for the Czech Republic, see Figure 13,
but is lagging rather than leading the actual rating changes except in 1997. However, discrepancies
are small, less than one notch. Looking at Hungary, Figure 14, the model follows the rating closely,
indicating that the opinion of Standard & Poor’s and the econometric model agree.
In Korea, Figure 15, the model shadows the rating, as the high coefficient of the lagged rating makes
any over- or underrating (compared to macroeconomic fundamentals) feed into the model forecast.
However, the model captures the downgrade in 1998 but, as noted before, the rating minimum is not
met by the model. Instead it is flattened out, suggesting that the downgrading was too sharp. Korea
got upgraded in 1999 and again in 2000, again supporting that the rating downgrade was too harsh. In
Thailand, Figure 16, the model estimates also lag the rating. The model does suggest a slower
downgrade than what really occurred but both are equal in 1999, suggesting that the rating institute
was forward-looking.
In this section a dynamic model has been estimated to explain sovereign rating developments over
time. This model is better specified than the static one as it has a higher explanatory power and also
no error autocorrelation. As for the static model the dynamic model manages to capture the
downgrades but underestimates the magnitude of them, at least for the East Asian countries in13
1997/98. There is also support for the view that rating adjustments are late, rather than forward-
looking, using Argentina as an example. However, whether rating adjustments are early or late when
it really matters, i.e. in crisis times, will be further explored in the next section.
4.3 Are ratings forward-looking?
As stated earlier, credit ratings are long-term assessments based on economic fundamentals. This
implies that they should react before a crisis or when the effect of the crisis influences the
fundamentals. Also, because of the ratings’ forward-looking properties countries should be
downgraded ahead of a crisis if the crisis is so severe that it will affect the macroeconomic
fundamentals. To evaluate whether this holds the ratings are plotted against a continuous crisis index
consisting of high, out-of-the-ordinary exchange-rate and interest-rate events, see Eliasson and
Kreuter (2001) for a complete description. The crisis measure is generated by a maximum value of
exchange rate returns, interest rate increases or a high level of the latter. The index is created on a
monthly basis but transformed into annual data using the mean of the year, just like the S&P ratings.
Figures 17 – 20 (p. 23) depict Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand respectively. The dashed line
indicates the crisis index and the solid line the S&P rating category.
For both Indonesia and Korea, Figures 17 and 18 respectively, the crisis indicator is rising while the
ratings are falling, hence, the S&P is acting in the midst of the crisis downgrading the two. In Malaysia
and Thailand, see Figures 19 and 20, the rating and the crisis indicator increase simultaneously up to
1997, when both variables begin to decrease. In this case it appears as if the downgrade is taking
place when the worst of the crisis is over. This result can be due to the transformation of the crisis
index since the peaks are smoothed. However, the results support the view that ratings are pro-
cyclical rather than counter-cyclical, see Ferri et al. (1999). In all cases above, the crisis index is
increasing or has begun to fall when the downgrade occurs.
5. Conclusions
In this paper S&P sovereign credit ratings have been described in both a static and a dynamic
framework using solely macroeconomic indicators as explanatory variables. No qualitative variables
are included as there are no objective time series fully capturing the socio-political situation in the
countries, which is why a random-effect panel data model is applied as it allows for country-specific
omitted variables. It turns out that a few variables can explain a major part of the constituents as well
as the development in the rating categories. The results show that the actual rating adjustments have
been more volatile than economic fundamentals would justify. Moreover, the rating adjustments
appears to be pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical compared to both a crisis index as well as to the
economic fundamentals.14
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Appendix A




       Highest quality AAA 25
       High quality AA+ 24
AA 23
AA- 22
       Strong payment capacity A+ 21
A2 0
A- 19




       Likely to fulfil obligations BB+ 15
       Ongoing uncertainties BB 14
BB- 13














The ratings data are from Standard & Poor’s covering the period 1990 – 2000. The countries are
chosen due to the length of their rating series, rather than anything else. The countries included in the
estimations are: Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Croatia
(HRV), Czech  Republic (CZE), Egypt (EGY), Estonia (EST), Hungary (HUN), Indonesia (IDN), India
(IND), Israel (ISR), Jordan (JOR), Kazakhstan (KAZ), Korea (KOR), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU),
Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Pakistan (PAK), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), Romania
(ROM), Russia (RUS), Slovakia (SVK), Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR), Taiwan (TWN), Uruguay (URY),
and Venezuela (VEN).
Data source: World Development Indicators 2001, World Bank
Current account balance (% of GDP) (BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS)
External debt, total (DOD, current US$) (DT.DOD.DECT.CD)
Exports of goods and services (current US$) (NE.EXP.GNFS.CD)
GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) (NY.GDP.PCAP.KD)
GDP growth (annual %) (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) (FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG)
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) (DT.DOD.DSTC.ZS)
Net international reserves (excludes gold, current US$) (FI.RES.XGLD.CD)
Overall budget deficit, including grants (% of GDP) (GB.BAL.OVRL.GD.ZS)
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services) (DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS)
Exports of goods and services (annual % growth) (NE.EXP.GNFS.KD.ZG)
Interest rate spread (lending rate minus LIBOR) (FR.INR.LNLB)17
Table 1: Results of the static panel data model
Variables
Current account to GDP t-1
External debtt-1
Fiscal balance t-1
GDP per capita t-1
GDP annual growtht-1
Inflationt-1
External debt to export t-1
Export growtht-1




































































































































Note: *, **, *** refers to 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance respectively.18
Table 2: Results of the dynamic panel data model
Variables
∆ (Current account to GDP) t
∆ (External debt)t
∆ (Fiscal balance) t
∆ (GDP per capita) t
∆ (GDP annual growth)t
∆ (Inflation)t











































































































Ljung- Box Q test: 1 lag
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                              3 lags
















































Note: *, **, *** refers to 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance respectively.19
Figure 1: Residuals of the random effect static
panel data model: S-model 3.
Figure 2: Plot of actual ratings vs. forecasts of the
static panel data model: S-model 3.
Figure 3: The observed ratings (solid line) and the
estimated ratings for the static model (dashed) for
Korea, 1990-2000.
Figure 4: The observed ratings (solid line) and the
















































Figure 5: The observed ratings (solid line) and the
estimated ratings for the static model (dashed) for
Indonesia, 1993-2000.
Figure 6: The observed ratings (solid line) and the
estimated ratings for the static model (dashed) for
Argentina, 1994-2000.
Figure 7: The observed ratings (solid line) and the
estimated ratings for the static model (dashed) for
Russia, 1993-2000.
Figure 8: The observed ratings (solid line) and the
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Figure 9: Residuals of the random effect dynamic
panel data model: D-model 3.
Figure 10: Plot of actual ratings vs. forecasts of
the static panel data model: D-model 3.
Figure 11: The observed ratings (solid line) and
the estimated ratings for the static model
(dashed) for Argentina, 1995-1999.
Figure 12: The observed ratings (solid line) and
the estimated ratings for the static model
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Figure 13: The observed ratings (solid line) and
the estimated ratings for the static model
(dashed) for Czech Republic, 1995-1999.
Figure 14: The observed ratings (solid line) and
the estimated ratings for the static model
(dashed) for Hungary, 1994-1999.
Figure 15: The observed ratings (solid line) and
the estimated ratings for the static model
(dashed) for Korea, 1991-1999.
Figure 16: The observed ratings (solid line) and
the estimated ratings for the static model
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Figure 17: The observed rating (solid line) and
the crisis indicator (dashed) for Indonesia, 1993-
2000.
Figure 18: The observed rating (solid line) and the
crisis indicator (dashed) for Korea, 1990-2000
Figure 19: The observed rating (solid line) and
the crisis indicator (dashed) for Malaysia, 1990-
2000
Figure 20: The observed rating (solid line) and the
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